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In the course of its 1984-85 term, the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit decided only a handful of environmental
law cases. Although the number of cases decided was small, a wide array
of issues were raised by the cases and the impacts of the resolutions of the
cases are of substantial import to the field of environmental law.
Among the issues presented to the Seventh Circuit during the term
were the right of a public interest group to intervene in a condemnation
action involving the United States of America and a private land owner1
and the power of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to make public a
set of corporate internal documents. 2 Additionally, issues arose under
the Clean Air Act,3 the Clean Water Act 4 and the National Environmen-
tal Policy Act.5 Under the Clean Air Act, the court was called on to
decide whether the United States Environmental Protection Agency 6 had
the power to alter, by partially approving, a state air pollution regula-
tion.7 Under the Clean Water Act, the Seventh Circuit ruled on whether
the EPA unlawfully failed to promulgate Total Maximum Daily Load's
for discharges of pollutants into Lake Michigan" and, whether the EPA
in setting national wastewater pretreatment standards failed to ade-
quately take into account petitioner's alleged unique situation. 9 Finally,
the court decided whether under the National Environmental Policy Act
an environmental impact statement1° or a supplemental environmental
impact statement was required to issue in specific situations.11
This article will address the Seventh Circuit's environmental law de-
cisions. Additionally, this article will discuss and analyze the reasoning
* B.S., Law Enforcement Administration, Western Illinois University, 1982; J.D., IIT Chi-
cago-Kent College of Law, 1986.
1. United States v. 36.96 Acres of Land, 754 F.2d 855 (7th Cir. 1985).
2. General Elec. Co. v. NRC, 750 F.2d 1394 (7th Cir. 1984).
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401 et seq. (1978).
4. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 et seq. (1978).
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 et seq. (1969).
6. Hereinafter referred to as "EPA."
7. Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Gorsuch, 742 F.2d 1028 (7th Cir. 1984).
8. Scott v. City of Hammond, 741 F.2d 992 (7th Cir. 1984).
9. Cerro Copper Prods. Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 766 F.2d 1060 (7th Cir. 1985).
10. River Rd. Alliance, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs of United States Army, 764 F.2d 445 (7th Cir.
1985).
11. Wisconsin v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1984).
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used by the court in resolving the issues presented. Finally, this article
will discuss the propriety of the court's conclusions and the potential
effects flowing from the decisions.
PUBLIC INTEREST CASES
United States v. 36. 96 Acres of Land 12 came before the Seventh Cir-
cuit on appeal from a district court denying Save The Dunes Council's
13
motion to intervene in the United States condemnation action against the
Northern Indiana Public Service Company. 14 The underlying condem-
nation action involved a 36.96 acre tract of land-commonly known as
Crescent Dune-situated in Indiana on the southern edge of Lake Michi-
gan. The Indiana Dunes Lakeshore Act 1 5 authorizes the Secretary of the
Interior to acquire Crescent Dune. Pursuant to the Act, the United
States instituted the condemnation proceeding in 1978 against the North-
ern Indiana Public Service Company, 16 the owner of the land. However,
the Secretary of the Interior abandoned attempts to acquire Crescent
Dune in 1983; thus, the Save the Dunes' Council 7 filed a motion to inter-
vene in the action, in essence, to assert a position on behalf of the govern-
ment. The district court denied the motion and the Council appealed .
8
On appeal, the Council argued that intervention should be granted
as of right under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24.19 Accordingly, the
issue on appeal boiled down to whether the Council, as a proposed inter-
venor, possessed "a direct, significant legally protectable interest in the
property or transaction subject to the action" necessary to obtain inter-
12. 754 F.2d 855 (7th Cir. 1985).
13. Save The Dunes Council is an Indiana not-for-profit corporation. It lobbies extensively for
national legislation protecting the Indiana Dunes for public use and for the expansion of protected
areas.
14. 36.96 Acres of Land, 754 F.2d at 857.
15. 16 U.S.C. § 460u-12 (1976). The Act placed both time and monetary limitations on the
condemnation. For example, the land could not be purchased at a cost greater than $800,000 as
adjusted by the Consumer Price Index, excluding the administrative costs. Id.
16. Hereinafter referred to as "NIPSCO."
17. Hereinafter referred to as "Council."
18. United States v. 36.96 Acres of Land, 754 F.2d 855, 858 (7th Cir. 1984).
19. Id. at 858. There are four requirements to be met before intervention as of right will be
granted. The proposed intervenors must satisfy each requirement before intervention will be
granted. CFTC v. Heritage Capital Advisory Servs. Ltd., 736 F.2d 384, 386 (7th Cir. 1984). First,
"the application must be timely (This requirement was not in dispute in the present case.). Second,
the intervenor must show an interest relating to the property or transaction which is the subject of
the action. Third, the intervenor must show as a practical matter the disposition will impair the
intervenor's ability to protect that interest. Finally, intervenor must show that that interest is not
adequately represented by the existing parties. Gauhcaux v. Pierce, 690 F.2d 616, 635 (7th Cir.
1982). The majority in 36. 96 Acres of Land did not reach the third and fourth requirement. 36. 96
Acres of Land, 754 F.2d at 858-60.
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vention as of right.20
Initially, the court pointed out that the sovereign authority to con-
demn property for public use is a direct, significant legally protectable
interest. However, the Council could not assert that its right to intervene
derived from the sovereign authority because Congress had not delegated
that authority to the Council. 2' Further, the Council manifestly had no
ownership interest in Crescent Dune considering that NIPSCO owned
the land.22 The Council was in no position to assert either relevant
interest.
The Council argued, however, that its members' personal aesthetic,
conversational and recreational interest in the property was a sufficient
interest to permit intervention. 23 The Seventh Circuit quickly noted that
although such an environmental interest would be sufficient to confer
standing in a claim under the Administrative Procedure Act,24 this claim
arose under Rule 24 and the direct and substantial interest required
under Rule 24 is qualitatively distinct from the interest required under
the APA. The interest of the Rule 24 intervenor must be greater than
the interest necessary to satisfy the standing requirement of the APA. In
short, the Council's environmental interest in NIPSCO's property was
not a direct and substantial interest as required by Rule 24.25 Therefore,
the court affirmed the denial of the Council's motion to intervene as of
right.
26
In a sharp dissent, Judge Cudahy criticized the majority's position
as being "a myopic position unsupported by any authority. ' 27 Consider-
ing that the Secretary of the Interior had abandoned attempts to acquire
Crescent Dune, Judge Cudahy argued, Congress' interest in acquiring
the land was supported only by the Council. Moreover, Judge Cudahy
20. 36.96 Acres of Land, 754 F.2d at 858 (quoting Wade v. Goldschmidt, 673 F.2d 182, 185
(7th Cir. 1982)). See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2). (Hereinafter referred to as "Rule 24").
21. 36. 96 Acres of Land, 754 F.2d at 858-59. Only Congress has the authority to delegate the
sovereign authority and Congress had delegated the authority to the Secretary of the Interior.
22. Id. at 858. The interest of the sovereign in the exercise of the power of eminent domain and
the interest in private land ownership are the only legal interests considered in an eminent domain
proceeding. Id. at 858.
23. Id. at 859. This argument was founded upon Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972)
which was brought under Section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 702. In Sierra
Club the Supreme Court held that aesthetic and environmental interests alone, without allegations of
individual injury, were not sufficient to establish standing under the Act. Sierra Club, 405 U.S. at
734-35.
24. 5 U.S.C. § 702.
25. 36.96 Acres of Land, 754 F.2d at 859 and 860.
26. Id. at 860. The Seventh Circuit also affirmed the district court's ruling denying permissive
intervention. The Seventh Circuit held that the denial was not an abuse of discretion. Id. at 860.
See also Fed. R. Civ. P.24(b).
27. 3696 Acres of Land, 754 F.2d at 860 (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
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noted that the majority's distinction between an interest sufficient to in-
tervene was highly formalistic and void of precedential support. 28 After
emphasizing the fact that the Secretary of the Interior and NIPSCO had
entered into a stipulation to dismiss the condemnation action,29 the dis-
sent urged that standing should be sufficient interest to intervene where
the will of Congress would be frustrated by the stipulation.30 Finally,
Judge Cudahy argued that by recognizing that a mandamus proceeding
was available to the Council to protect its interest, the majority conceded
that the environmental interest was legally protectable, and thus, the in-
terest would clearly be direct and substantial enough to allow interven-
tion. 31 In sum, the majority was in the peculiar position of having
recognized that the Council had a legally protected interest for the pur-
pose of a mandamus proceeding but not to intervene.
The majority's rigid approach to intervention operates to thwart the
Congressional interest in the acquisition of the land, as well as the public
interest and benefit in the use of the land. By setting forth such an exact-
ing standard for intervention, the 39.96 Acres of Land court has made it
possible for government inaction or concerted action between the govern-
ment and the landowner to frustrate the will of Congress to acquire land.
Moreover, under the decision, an environmental interest alone will ap-
parently never be enough to intervene. Although the public was to bene-
fit from the acquisition of the land, this strict standard leaves the public
without a remedy or recourse, except the extraordinary remedy of the
writ of mandamus. If the government refuses to carry out the interests of
Congress and the public is blocked from protecting those interests, no
one remains to further the interests and the interests will become mean-
ingless. With no practical method of protection available, the environ-
mental interest will exist only in theory. In reality, the interest will
suddenly disappear when it is sought to be protected by the public. An
interest incapable of protection is tantamount to no interest at all.
A somewhat similar case decided by the Seventh Circuit involving
the public interest was General Electric Co. v. NRC. 32 Here, the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission 33 decided to make public a set of General Elec-
28. Id. at 861 (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
29. Id. at 857-58.
30. Id. at 861 (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
31. Id. at 862 n.1 (Cudahy, J., dissenting). The majority noted that a writ of mandamus was
available to the council under 28 U.S.C. sec. 361. 36.95 Acres, 754 F.2d at 860. Indeed, the Council
had filed complaints for mandamus which were still pending. Id. at 860.
32. 750 F.2d 1394 (7th Cir. 1984).
33. Hereinafter referred to as the "NRC."
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tric's internal documents known as the Reed Report.34 The Reed Report
was to be released under the Freedom of Information Act. 35 The NRC,
in terse orders denied General Electric's requests not to release the Reed
Report and to withdraw the report. General Electric brought suit to en-
join the release. However, the district court upheld the NRC's decision
to release the report and General Electric appealed.
36
The Seventh Circuit first determined that the Reed Report was an
agency record37 and as such was the proper subject for release under the
Freedom of Information Act. The more difficult question, however, was
whether Exemption 438 of the Act, which protects certain types of trade
secrets, precluded the release of the report by the NRC. In a proceeding
to decide whether to release the report, the NRC issued a brief opinion
3 9
concluding that Exemption 4 did not apply. The terse NRC opinion left
the Seventh Circuit without a clear foundation to review the NRC con-
clusion. Although the court was presented with affidavits supporting the
NRC opinion, the affidavits were not made part of the opinion; thus, the
Seventh Circuit could not consider the affidavits and could only speculate
as to the reason for the NRC's decision. Unable to provide effective ap-
pellate review based on the NRC's thin opinion, the court remanded the
matter to the NRC to explain its findings in further detail. 40
The court conceded in speculation that it was unlikely that the re-
lease of the report would cause substantial competitive harm to General
Electric.4  Moreover, it recognized that forcing the NRC to write an-
34. General Elec., 750 F.2d at 1396. The Reed Report is a study of General Electric's boiling
water reactor which is used to generate nuclear power. The report contains several criticisms of the
reactor's design, including criticisms of its safety. Id.
35. 5 U.S.C. § 552.
36. General Elec. Co. v. NRC, 750 F.2d 1394, 1396 (7th Cir. 1984).
37. Id. at 1398. Although the Freedom of Information Act does not specifically define "agency
record" the term clearly encompasses documents created by an agency, as well as, documents sub-
mitted to an agency for use in carrying out its duties. See, e.g., Weisberg v. United States Dep't of
Justice, 631 F.2d 824, 827-28 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
38. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4). This provision provides, inter alia, that trade secrets not of the secret-
formula type are exempt only if disclosure would; (a) inflict substantial competitive harm on the
owner of the information, or (b) make it difficult for the releasing agency to acquire similar informa-
tion in the future. See, e.g., National Parks & Conservation Ass'n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765, 770
(D.C. Cir. 1974). The General Electric court deemed factor (b) above a "managerial judgment"
beyond extensive judicial review. General Elec., 750 F.2d at 1402.
39. General Elec., 750 F.2d at 1403. The NRC opinion in its entirety stated only that "the staff
[had] advised the Commission that it did not have an adequate basis to conclude that the release of
the report would cause substantial harm to GE's competitive position." Id.
40. Id. at 1403-04.
41. Id. at 1403. In determining that the release would not cause such harm, the court consid-
ered several factors. General Electric is the dominant producer of nuclear reactors. In addition part
of the report had been revealed in congressional hearings. Moreover, the report was five years old
when the NRC ordered its release. Finally, the court noted that those requesting the report were
opponents of nuclear power in general. Those persons would rather embarrass the industry as a
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other opinion would probably not lead to a different result. 42 Finally, the
court acknowledged that delay accompanying the writing of the new
opinion would strip the release of its impact, thus, permitting General
Electric to "win" the litigation by sheer delay.
43
The General Electric Co. decision is clearly a victory for form over
substance. Further, it is an ineffective use of time to require the NRC to
write a new opinion. The NRC already had affadavits to support its ini-
tial opinion but the NRC failed to incorporate the affidavits into its opin-
ion. The NRC can easily include the same affidavits in the rewritten
opinion. Moreover, the Seventh Circuit speculated as to the reason for
the NRC's decision. The NRC may choose merely to adopt the court's
reasoning by speculation and incorporate it into the rewritten opinion.
The end result may be a new NRC opinion written just as the Seventh
Circuit believed was necessary in the first instance. The new opinion
would contain the pre-existing affidavits and the reasoning the court re-
ferred to from the first opinion. In short, all the information that was
necessary for a sufficient NRC opinion was present in the first opinion:
however, the information was expressed in an improper form.
The rewriting process may take years.44 In the meantime, the public
is left without access to information, from General Electric's mouth, crit-
icizing the safety of its own nuclear reactor. Considering, as the court
noted, that releasing the report would not substantially harm General
Electric's competitive position, it is unclear what is to be gained from the
General Electric Co. ruling. The message from the Seventh Circuit, how-
ever, is clear. Strict compliance with procedural rules will be required
even though such compliance may bring no substantial benefit and may
block public access to information it would otherwise be entitled to under
the Freedom of Information Act.
Both General Electric Co. and 36. 96 Acres ofLand 45 are decisions in
which a requirement of strict adherence to procedure thwarted the envi-
ronmental interest. In General Electric Co. by requiring the NRC to
rewrite its opinion which varied from acceptable form, the public was
stopped from receiving timely information calling into question the
safety of certain nuclear reactors. A contrary decision in the case would
have resulted in the release of the information consistent with the policy
whole than to shift business from General Electric to another producer. Thus, the competitive harm
to be done by the release of the single report was too speculative. Id.
42. Id. at 1404.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. See infra note 12 and accompanying text.
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of the Freedom of Information Act without causing General Electric
substantial competitive injury. Similarly, in 36. 96 Acres of Land, a strict
adherence to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24's requirements for inter-
vention precluded the condemnation of Crescent Dune. A contrary deci-
sion in the case would have resulted in the acquisition of the land
consistent with the desire expressed by Congress when it authorized the
land's acquisition under the Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore Act.
PARTIAL APPROVAL OF REVISED STATE IMPLEMENTATION PLANS
Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Gorsuch46 concerned the EPA's power to
partially approve a state implementation plan 47 submitted to the EPA for
implementing the EPA's air quality standards. Pursuant to the Clean
Air Act's48 mandate, in 1972 the State of Indiana submitted a SIP to the
EPA for approval. The exact application of the SIP to noncumbustion
emissions from Bethlehem's Burns Harbor Works was unclear. How-
ever, in 1975, Indiana submitted a revised SIP to the EPA which covered
the Burns Harbor Works. 49 The revised SIP contained new limitations
on noncombustion emissions, in addition to a fifteen minute exemption
or blow-off period during which those limitations could be exceeded.50
The EPA is authorized by the Clean Air Act to approve a SIP "or any
portion thereof." 51 Additionally, the Seventh Circuit had previously
held that the EPA has the power to partially approve revised SIP's
although the Act does not expressly grant that power.52 Accordingly, in
46. 742 F.2d 1028 (7th Cir. 1984).
47. Hereinafter referred to as "SIP".
48. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a).
49. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 742 F.2d at 1030. The revised SIP eliminated the distinction be-
tween combustion and noncombustion emissions and made 40 percent opacity the mandatory limita-
tion measure for both sources. Id. at 1031. However, the revised SIP contained a blow-off period
which allowed the opacity limits to be exceeded for up to 15 minutes every 24 hours. Id. at 1032.
The revised SIP set, for the first time, mandatory limits on opacity of noncombustion emissions. Id.
at 1034. Considering that the Burns Harbor Works generated significant noncombustion emissions,
Bethlehem contended that it could comply with the opacity limit without the blow-off period. Thus,
without the blow-off period, Bethlehem argued, the Burns Harbor Works would have to be shut
down. Id. Although it was not greatly emphasized in the decision, the concern that the EPA
modified SIP may have resulted in the closing of the works may have been a strongly influential
factor in the court's decision.
50. See infra note 49.
51. 42 U.S.C. sec. 7410(b)(2).
52. Public Serv. Co. v. EPA, 682 F.2d 626, 631-34 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1127
(1983). In Public Serv. Co., the court upheld the disapproval of the very same blow-off period at
issue in Bethlehem. The blow-off period was an attempt by Indiana to weaken its existing plan. Id.
at 636. However, only combustion facilities were involved in Public Serv. Co. while noncombustion
facilities were involved in Bethlehem Steel Corp. The combustion facilities had previously been sub-
jected to opacity limitations, but the noncombustion had not. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 742 F.2d at
1034. See also infra note 49.
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the instant case the EPA approved the revised SIP's noncombustion limi-
tations, but disapproved the blow-off period and ordered Bethlehem to
comply with this EPA modified SIP.
5 3
Although the EPA has the authority to partially approve an original
or revised SIP, the case at bar presented a unique situation. By disap-
proving the blow-off period while approving the new limitations set by
the revised SIP, the EPA effectively made the emission limits more strin-
gent than it had ever been. The previous cases addressing partial ap-
proval arose in a situation where the revised SIP lessened the limits.
54
Thus, the issue on appeal was whether the EPA acted properly where, by
its partial approval, it made a portion of the SIP substantially more
strict. The question was one of first impression.55
The Seventh Circuit noted that the Clean Air Act establishes a pro-
cedure by which the EPA can disapprove a portion of a SIP and replace
it with the EPA's own more stringent regulation. 56 Under this proce-
dure, the EPA would be required to first reject the regulation in the SIP,
next promulgate a different regulation, and then afford the state a chance
to submit its own substitute regulation. 57 Nevertheless, the EPA by-
passed this procedure when it merely rejected the state regulation and
ordered compliance with the EPA's own version of the regulation. This
procedural short-cut was unauthorized and proved to be fatal.
58
By partially approving the revised SIP, the court continued, the
EPA turned the SIP into "something completely unpalatable" to Indi-
ana. 59 The partial approval was, in actuality, an elimination by deletion,
not a partial approval of anything sought by Indiana. The court declared
that to partially approve requires at least granting the proposer part of
what he wanted. 6°
Moreover, the court found that the procedural short cut taken by
the EPA infringed upon the state-federal partnership created by the Act.
"The Clean Air Act is an experiment in federalism, and the EPA may
not run roughshod over the procedural prerogatives that the Act has re-
served to the states."161 Therefore the EPA order requiring compliance
53. See 40 Fed. Reg. 50032, 50033 (Oct. 28, 1975).
54. See infra note 52.
55. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 742 F.2d at 1035.
56. Id. at 1034. See also 42 U.S.C. § 7410(c)(1)(B).
57. 42 U.S.C. § 7410(c)(1).
58. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 742 F.2d at 1035.
59. Id. at 1036.
60. Id. at 1025.
61. Id. at 1036.
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with the EPA modified revised SIP was set aside. 62 In short, the EPA
was not within its authority when it partially approved the revised SIP to
make the regulation more stringent.
While the Bethlehem Steel Corp. decision broke new ground, the
Seventh Circuit was careful not to stray from the concept of federalism
that underlies the Clean Air Act. Admittedly, the EPA may have
reached the same result it did via its short-cut as it would have reached
had it followed the mandated procedure. 63 However, the procedural er-
ror was not a trivial one. It was an affront to the core of the federalism
concept upon which the Clean Air Act was founded. The concept de-
mands state-federal cooperation, not federal domination. In the instant
case, to have allowed the procedural short-cut would have been at odds
with the federalism concept supporting the Act.
Moreover, and maybe more importantly to the court, by demanding
from the EPA compliance with the statutorily mandated procedures, the
court may have prevented the closing of the Bums Harbor Works. Had
the EPA modified SIP become law, the Bums Harbor Works may not
have been able to comply with the new limitations. Bethlehem Steel may
have been left with no alternative but to close the works.. Such a result
was not intended when the State of Indiana submitted its revised SIP.
THE CLEAN WATER ACT CASES
Scott v. City of Hammond 64 reached the Seventh Circuit when
plaintiff, formerly Attorney General William J. Scott, appealed from a
district court dismissal of his complaint for failure to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted. 65 The crux of the appeal concerned the
complaint's allegation that the EPA had unlawfully failed to establish
Total Maximum Daily Loads66 for discharges of pollutants into Lake
Michigan as required by the Clean Water Act.
Under the state-federal cooperative scheme of the Act, the EPA ini-
tially identifies pollutants to which TMDL's apply.67 Next, the state is
required to develop TMDL's and submit them to the EPA.68 After re-
62. Id. at 1037. The court added, however, where the effect of a partial approval was to
strengthen a previous limitation, if the increase is only apparent rather than real, or if real, only
minor, the EPA has not exceeded its authority. Id.
63. Id. at 1036.
64. 741 F.2d 992 (7th Cir. 1984).
65. Id. at 993-94. For the purposes of a Rule 12(b)(6) appeal, the court assumes the truth of
the complaint's factual allegation. Fed. R. Civ. Pr. 12(b)(6). See also Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,
45-46 (1957).
66. Hereinafter referred to as "TMDL."
67. See 33 U.S.C. § 1314(a)(2)(D).
68. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(1).
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ceiving the state submission, the EPA has nondiscretionary duty to either
approve or disapprove the submitted TMDL within 30 days. If the
TMDL is disapproved, the EPA must establish the necessary TMDL.
69
In the instant case, although the EPA's initial identification was tardy,
Illinois and Indiana-at the time the cast was decided-had yet to make
the necessary submissions to the EPA.70 The district court agreed with
the EPA that it had no duty to proceed under the statutory scheme until
the states submitted the TMDL's.
7 1
The Seventh Circuit disagreed with the district court. The circuit
court ruled that the states' prolonged failure over a long period of time
may amount to a "constructive submission" of no TMDL's, in effect,
that no TMDL's were necessary. 72 Therefore, under the Act the EPA
would be under a nondiscretionary duty to either approve or disapprove
the "constructive submission" within the allotted timetable. 73 Further,
the court noted, the EPA's inaction in the face of the states' default ap-
peared to be tantamount to approval of the states' decision that no
TMDL's were necessary.
74
A major basis for the decision in Scott was that the court did not
believe that state inaction amounting to refusal to act should stand in the
way of anti-water pollution policy. 75 Moreover, the court did not believe
that Congress intended that the states by inaction could prevent the im-
plementation of TMDL's. 76 Thus, the Scott court employed the "con-
structive submission" theory. 77 The theory was developed to further the
policy of the Clean Water Act-to control water pollution-while avoid-
ing the rigid procedural requirements of the Act. Arguably, the Seventh
Circuit could have developed an analogous theory or taken similar steps
in General Electric Co.. 78 Such steps would have furthered the policy of
the Freedom of Information Act-providing the public with access to
certain information-while avoiding strict compliance with the applica-
ble procedure.
69. See 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(2).
70. Scott v. City of Hammond, 741 F.2d 992, 996 n. 10 (7th Cir. 1984). The state submissions
were due on June 26, 1979. Id.
71. Id. at 996.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 997. The Seventh Circuit left it to the district court to determine on remand whether
the states made a 'constructive submission." If so, the failure of the EPA to act would amount to
failure to perform a nondiscretionary duty, which was properly raised by the complaint. Id. at 998.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 997.
77. See infra notes 66-74 and accompanying text.
78. See infra notes 32-44 and accompanying text.
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Indeed, General Electric Co. was apparently more readily suscepti-
ble to the use of such a theory than Scott. In General Electric Co. every-
thing necessary for compliance with proper procedure was available.
Moreover, use of a theory side-stepping the strict procedure would have
furthered the policy of the Freedom of Information Act without causing
substantial competitive harm to General Electric. However, the court
did not employ such a theory. By contrast, in Scott neither of the ele-
ments necessary to comply with the Clean Water Act's procedure, the
states' submission of TMDL's and the EPA approval, were present in the
case. Further, while the decision carried out the policy of the Act, it
resulted in the states being deemed to have acted in a manner they did
not in fact act. Clearly, this result is more harsh than the potential result
from a contrary decision in General Electric Co.. Nonetheless, the Scott
court was willing to reach such a result. Reaching a similar decision in
General Electric Co. would have allowed the public access to critical in-
formation without causing any extensive harm. Therefore, General Elec-
tric Co. should have been decided consistently with Scott.
A second case involving the Clean Water Act was Cerro Copper
Products Co. v. Ruckelshaus.79 The issue in the case was whether the
EPA failed to adequately consider Cerro Copper's alleged unique situa-
tion when the EPA promulgated national wastewater pretreatment stan-
dards for the copper-forming industry. 80 The Clean Water Act provides
that indirect dischargers81 pretreat their wastewater before passing it on
to publicly owned treatment works82 for additional treatment. 83 In con-
nection with this, the EPA is to establish standards for the discharge into
POTW of pollutants which are determined not to be susceptible to treat-
ment by the POTW or which would interfere with the operation of the
POTW.8 4 In addition, EPA regulations provide that dischargers be clas-
sified into industrial categories and standards apply universally to each
category.8 5 In 1983, the EPA determined it most effective to regulate the
copper-forming industry as a single category and issued one set of pre-
79. 766 F.2d 1060 (7th Cir. 1985).
80. Id. at 1067. Cerro Copper is part of the copper-forming industry. Id.
81. An "indirect discharger" is a discharger whose wastewater passes through a publicly owned
treatment works. Cerro Copper is an indirect discharger. Id. at 1061.
82. Hereinafter referred to as "POTW."
83. See 33 U.S.C. § 1317(b)(1).
84. For example: The EPA found that POTW's were ineffective in treating the toxic pollu-
tants-such as chromium, copper, lead, nickel, zinc, and toxic organics-present in wastewater from
copper forming facilities, 48 Fed. Reg. 36,945 (1983). Thus, those pollutants pass through POTW's.
Id. at 36,946.
85. See 40 C.F.R. § 403.6 (1984).
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treatment standards for the entire industry. 86
The thrust of Cerro Copper's argument on appeal was that it should
not be subject to the industry-wide standards based on its unique situa-
tion. The argument was based on the fact that Cerro Copper discharged
its wastewater into a Sauget, Illinois POTW. However, in 1986 a re-
gional POTW was to be in operation and receiving dischargers from the
Sauget POTW. Thus, Cerro Copper's wastewater would be "pretreated"
by the Sauget POTW before being shipped to the new regional POTW.
In short, the Sauget POTW was Cerro Copper's pretreatment and any
pretreatment by Cerro Copper would be merely "treatment for treat-
ment's sake." Therefore, Cerro Copper was in a unique situation and
should not be forced to comply with the industry-wide standard.
The Seventh Circuit was not persuaded by the argument. Upon
looking to legislative history of the Clean Water Act, the court declared
that it was clear that Congress intended that the EPA promulgate the
uniform standards on a national basis.8 7 Further, Congress expressly
intended that EPA not take into account the specific characteristics of
each individual discharger. Such individualized consideration would
render settling national standards virtually impossible.88  Considering
that the EPA made a thorough and exhaustive study89 of the copper-
forming industry prior to establishing the national standards, the court
upheld the standards as fair and reasonable. 90
The ruling left Cerro Copper in a peculiar situation. Previously the
EPA had a procedure to allow individual dischargers to receive a vari-
ance from the national standard. Under this procedure, an individual
discharger could set forth "fundamentally different factors" to show that
a variance was warranted. 91 However, in response to a Third Circuit
86. See 48 Fed. Reg. 36, 944 (1983). The conclusion was based on the fact that all American
copper forming facilities perform the same basic operations: hot rolling, cold rolling, extrusion,
drawing, and forging. These operations utilize water, oil-water emulsions, or soluble oil-water mix-
tures such as lubricants that are included within the wastewater discharge. Cerro Copper Prods., 760
F.2d at 1064.
87. Cerro Copper Prods. Co., 760 F.2d at 1067-68.
88. Id. at 1068.
89. The EPA solicited information from each of the 176 facilities within the copper-forming
industry. See 48 Fed. Reg. 36,942-67 (1983).
90. Cerro Copper Prods. Co., 760 F.2d at 1068.
91. See 40 C.F.R. § 403.13(b). The factors considered in deciding whether to grant such a
variance include the nature and quality of the pollutant, the volume of wastewater discharge, the
environmental impact, the energy requirements, the age, size and land availability of the industrial
facility, and the cost of compliance with control technology. See 40 C.F.R. § 403.13(d). The factors
expressly not considered include the feasibility of installing pretreatment equipment, the inability to
pay for the waste treatment, and the impact of the discharge upon the quality of the POTW's receiv-
ing waters. See 40 C.F.R. § 403.13(e).
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decision 92 holding that fundamentally different factors variances were
prohibited by the Clean Water Act, the EPA withdrew the procedure. 93
Subsequently, the Third Circuit decision was reversed by the Supreme
Court, 94 but as of the date of the present trial, the EPA had yet to rein-
state the fundamentally different factors variance procedure. Thus,
Cerro Copper was without a method to seek special consideration.
Nonetheless, the Seventh Circuit ruled that Cerro Copper must comply
with the national standards. The court added, however, that when the
EPA reinstates the variance procedure, 95 Cerro Copper would be free to
pursue that avenue.
96
As in the Scott 97 case, the Cerro Copper Products Co. court was very
aware of the Congressional intent underlying the litigation. The court
was willing to insure that the intent be carried out even though Cerro
Copper was left "between a rock and a hard place." Cerro Copper may
have been able to show fundamentally different factors relevant to its
facility which would have warranted a variance from the national stan-
dard. However, the variance procedure had been discontinued by the
EPA. Although the EPA claimed it would reinstate the procedure in the
near future, the Seventh Circuit remained firm and ordered Cerro Cop-
per to comply with the national standard in the interim.
Though not express in its opinion, in reaching its decision the Sev-
enth Circuit may have considered the potential for delay in the EPA's
reinstating the variance procedure. Had the Court reached a contrary
result, the longer the time lapse between the instant decision and the
reinstatement of the variance procedure, the longer the potential time
period that Cerro Copper Products would have been in non-compliance
with the national standard. Moreover, there was no guarantee that
Cerro Copper would have been granted a variance after the procedure
was reinstated. Delays in EPA actions are not altogether unusual.98
Thus, the Seventh Circuit's strict adherence to the then existing statutes
92. National Ass'n of Metal Finisher v. EPA, 719 F.2d 624, 646 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd on other
grounds, 105 S. Ct. 1102 (1985).
93. See 49 Fed. Reg. 5131 (1984).
94. Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. National Res. Defense Coun., 105 S. Ct. 1102, 1112 (1985).
95. In view of the recent Supreme Court decision, the EPA planned to reinstate the variance
procedure in the near future. See Cerro Copper Prods. Co., 760 F.2d at 1070.
96. Id.
97. See infra notes 64-77 and accompanying text.
98. See, e.g., Scott v. City of Hammond, 741 F.2d 992 (7th Cir. 1984). Scott involved the Clean
Water Act. Under the Act, the EPA was required by law to identify pollutants to which TMDL's
applied by October 18, 1973. 33 U.S.C. § 1314(a)(2)(D). However, the EPA did not make the
required identifications until December 28, 1978, some five years late. Scott, 741 F.2d at 996 n.10.
Considering such delays in carrying outs its mandatory duty, there is arguably some question as to
the degree of promptness the EPA would use in reinstating the variance procedure.
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and procedures furthered the environmental interests. The Cerro Copper
Products Co. decision, by requiring compliance with the national stan-
dard, prevented the discharge of pollutants into waterways while the
EPA took steps to reinstate the fundamentally different factors variance
procedure.
THE NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACT CASES
Two of the most significant cases decided by the Seventh Circuit in
its 1984-85 term fell under the National Environmental Policy Act.99
River Road Alliance, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers of United States Army 100
revolved around the duty to issue an environmental impact statement. 101
Similarly, Wisconsin v. Weinberger102 concerned the duty to issue a sup-
plemental environmental impact statement.10 3 Each case produced a
lengthy majority opinion which was contrasted by a sharp dissent.
In River Road Alliance, Inc., the Corps of Engineers of United
States Army ("Corps") issued to National Marine Service a permit for a
temporary barge fleeting facility t°4 along a portion of the Mississippi
River. That portion of river undergoes heavy barge traffic; however, the
corresponding shoreline is scenic and free from commercial develop-
ment.10 5 After holding a public hearing, the Corps issued an "environ-
mental assessment" concluding that the facility would have no significant
environmental impact. 0 6 However, no EIS was issued.
NEPA requires that the appropriate government agency-in this
case, the Corps-issue an EIS for any major federal action significantly
affecting the quality of the environment. 0 7 Having found that the facil-
ity would have no significant environmental impact, the Corps concluded
that no EIS was necessary, and thus, granted the permit. After the facil-
ity went into operation, a local neighborhood group filed suit to enjoin
99. Hereinafter referred to as "NEPA."
100. 764 F.2d 445 (7th Cir. 1985).
101. Hereinafter referred to as "EIS."
102. 745 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1984).
103. Hereinafter referred to as "SEIS."
104. The Seventh Circuit described a barge fleeting facility as a "a maratime parking lot" for
barges. River Rd Alliance, Inc., 764 F.2d at 447.
105. Id. A road along the Illinois shore allows motorists a view of the "dramatic bluffs" and
farm land near the site in question. Indeed, the Corps acknowledged that the "bluff and river areas
... clearly provide some of the most impressive and unique vistas of any area along the Mississippi
River." See id.
106. Id. Aside from aesthetic factors, see infra note 105, the environmental assessment ad-
dressed the impact of the facility on a large mussel bed downstream, on neighboring towns, on
wintering catfish and on fishing, boating and other sports in the area. River Rd. Alliance, Inc., 764
F.2d at 448.
107. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C)(i).
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the operation of the facility. The district court granted the injunction,
shutting down the facility pending the outcome of the present appeal.
Although the district court expressly declined to rule whether the Corps
had a duty to issue an EIS, the thrust of the lower court's opinion was
that the Corps, when it issued the Environmental Assessment, did not
take a careful enough look at the environmental impacts of the facility.
However, on appeal, the majority cast the issue as whether the Corps
should have issued an EIS. 10 8 The appropriate standard of review was
that the Corps' decision not to issue an EIS would be set aside only if it
was an abuse of discretion.109
The majority's casting of the issue on appeal made it necessary for
court to apply the NEPA major federal action/significant environmental
effects test' 10 to the Corps' decision to grant the permit. The court began
its analysis of the test by assuming that the Corps' action in granting the
permit was a "major" federal action. 11 Consequently, the court contin-
ued on to examine the facts to determine whether the significant environ-
mental effects prong of the test was established. Considering that the
court assumed that the Corps' action was a major action, if that action
would significantly affect the quality of the environment the NEPA test
would require an EIS to be issued.
Initially, it was pointed out that the Corps was not unreasonable in
deeming the aesthetic objections insignificant. Moreover, "aesthetic ob-
jections alone will rarely compel the preparation of an (EIS)." 1 2 In ad-
dition, the Seventh Circuit characterized the other environmental effects
as "trivial, indeed."' 13  The floating facility would not obstruct other
boats. Plenty of room existed elsewhere for fishing.
In addition, the court harshly dismissed the argument that the facil-
ity would have caused harm to the underlying mussel bed. The River
Road Alliance's concern was that the mussels would be smothered by silt
stirred by boat propellors. The court noted that the mussels are not an
108. River Rd. Alliance, Inc., 764 F.2d at 448. In an effort to "promote clarity," on appeal the
majority stated the main issue as "whether the Corps should have prepared an (EIS)." Id.
109. Id. at 449. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 412, 417 (7th Cir. 1984).
110. "The major federal action/significant environmental effects tests" is merely a short-hand
method of referring to the requisites set out by NEPA for the issuance of an EIS. See infra note 107
and accompanying text.
111. River Rd. Alliance Inc., 764 F.2d at 450. The court noted that neither administrative regu-
lations nor precedent establish a standard definition of "major" in the present context. However,
considering cost in time and money of preparing an EIS, the court added that there has been a recent
trend away from requiring EIS's. Id. at 450-51.
112. Id. at 451. The court noted that there had been some testimony that some people would
enjoy the opportunity to observe a barge close up. Id.
113. Id.
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endangered species. Additionally, the mussels are owned by private per-
sons who have the right to do with the mussels as they please, including
"selling them for catfood" or "burying them in silt." 1 14 Similarly,
although the catfish are not owned until they are caught, catfish are not
an endangered species and the rest of the river provided the catfish with a
more than adequate habitat. Thus the impact on the catfish habitat
could reasonably be categorized by the Corp as insignificant. In sum, the
Corps' decision that the environmental impacts were insignificant and
therefore required no EIS, was not an abuse of discretion mandating
reversal." 5
River Road Alliance's final contention was that the Corps failed to
explore alternative sites for the facility as required by section 102(2)(E)
of NEPA." 6 However, National Marine Service had made a study of
alternative sites and found none suitable. This study was submitted unre-
butted to the Corps. The Seventh Circuit added the Corps was not in the
position to evaluate the feasibility of alternative sites in light of National
Marine Service's business needs. Accordingly, the Corps had to rely on
studies such as the one submitted by National Marine Service. 1 7 Find-
ing that the Corps had not abused its discretion, the Seventh Circuit re-
versed the decision of the district court with directions to vacate its
injunction and dismiss the suit.'1
Judge Wood filed a strong critical dissent. Judge Wood emphasized
the asethetic aspects of the case declaring that "thousands of people"
would be deprived of the enjoyment of the "unique scenic area" which
was "being sacrificed and ... damaged without sufficient justification for
the financial benefit of a private commercial company."' 19 However, the
dissent was not restricted to aesthetic concerns.
The dissent criticized the majority's recasting of the issue as whether
or not the Corps should have prepared an EIS. The lower court did not
reach that issue, Judge Wood argued, the lower court found only that the
Corps did not take the required "hard look" ' 2 at the environmental con-
sequences in preparation of the Environmental Assessment, thus, the as-
sessment was an inadequate basis to find no significant impact. The
114. Id. at 452.
115. Id.
116. Id. See also 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(E). This requirement is independent of the EIS issue and
applies even though the appropriate agency decides that an EIS is unnecessary. See, e.g., Nucleus of
Chicago Homeowners Ass'n v. Lynn, 524 F.2d 225, 232 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 967
(1976).
117. River Rd. Alliance, Inc., 764 F.2d at 453.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 454 (Wood, J., dissenting).
120. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976).
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lower court declared that the Corps only went through the motions in
preparing the assessment.
12 1
Judge Wood also disagreed with the majority's findings on the envi-
ronmental elements. 122 A proper focus, the dissent contended, on the
facility's impact on aesthetics, recreational activities and aquatic life
would clearly have warranted the conclusion that the Corps was required
to take a genuine "hard look."' 23 Finally, it was urged that the Corps
was not entitled to accept National Marine Service's study that no alter-
native site was feasible. NEPA squarely placed on the Corps the burden
to study alternative sites. That burden did not lie with the concerned
citizens or with National Marine Service. 124
The majority's subtle method of analysis may have a dramatic im-
pact on the hard look approach. By neatly recasting the issue on appeal
to "promote clarity,"'' 25 the majority was able to review a decision that
the district court never made. The recasting turned the issue from
merely whether the Corps failed to take a required serious or hard look
at the environmental consequences, to whether the Corps had abused its
discretion in determining that an EIS was unnecessary. However, the
essence of the lower court's ruling was not that the Corps abused its
discretion. On the contrary, the essence of the opinion was that by fail-
ing to take a hard look, the resulting Environmental Assessment did not
suffice to put the Corps in the position to exercise that discretion at all.
Moreover, the recasting of the issue placed the focus of the appeal to the
reasonableness of what the Corps decided, not on how the Corps made
the decision.
Continued and similar recasting of issues in future cases may elimi-
nate the necessity for an agency to take a hard look at the environmental
consequences when preparing an environmental assessment. As in the
instant case, the agency's decision not to issue an EIS may be based on a
conclusion contained in an Environmental Assessment that the project
will have no significant environmental impact. If a court reviews the de-
cision not to issue an EIS by merely analyzing the conclusion of the Envi-
ronmental Assessment, the basis of the Environmental Assessment is
ignored. Furthermore, when the basis of the Environmental Assessment
is ignored, the process leading to that basis is also ignored. The process
should be a hard look at the environmental impacts. However, if the
121. River Rd. Alliance, Inc., 764 F.2d at 455 (Wood, J., dissenting).
122. See infra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
123. River Rd Alliance, Inc., 764 F.2d at 455-57.
124. Id. at 458. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(E).
125. River Rd. Alliance, Inc., 746 F.2d at 448.
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hard look is ignored on review, the incentive of the agency to take a hard
look is greatly reduced.
In addition, by allowing the Corps to rely on National Marine Ser-
vice's obviously interested conclusion that no alternative site was suita-
ble, the Seventh Circuit let the fox guard the henhouse. However, the
applicable section of NEPA126 does not contemplate such one-sided con-
sideration. The Corps should be required at least to consider the compet-
ing interests when at issue is the feasibility of alternative sites.
Finally, the fact that the mussels and catfish threatened by the ac-
tion are not on the endangered species list should not be the determina-
tive factor in deciding that the environmental consequences are
insignificant. Species do not become endangered by magic overnight.
Continued commercial expansion is one way to destroy habitats of spe-
cies, thus, pushing the species to the edge of the endangered list. If the
courts are at all concerned with the preservation of wildlife some consid-
eration should be given to the action's impact on habits and the species
before the species are placed on the endangered list.
An issue similar to the issue in River Road Alliance, Inc. was raised
in Wisconsin v. Weinberger. 127 In the instant case, the question presented
was whether, based on relevant available information, the United States
Navy had a duty to issue a supplemental environmental impact state-
ment ("SEIS") when it undertook to reinstate a project which had previ-
ously been postponed.
The original project, announced in 1968, was to construct an ex-
tremely low frequency (ELF) submarine communication test facility in
northern Wisconsin.1 28 In 1978, President Carter decided to postpone
Project ELF indefinitely. However, in 1981, President Reagan decided
to reactivate the project. In accordance with the mandate of NEPA, the
Navy had issued EIS's for the pre-1981 Project ELF proposals. These
EIS's concluded that no adverse effects on human health would result
from the exposure to extremely low frequency electromagnetic radiation
produced by Project ELF. Although plaintiffs alleged that defendants
had made substantial changes in the project relevant to environmental
concerns and that significant new information bearing on environmental
concerns had come to light, when the project was reinstated in 1981 the
126. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(E).
127. 745 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1984).
128. Id. at 414. The ELF communication system would allow a submarine to receive messages
from land while remaining at operational speed at depths which would protect the submarine from
detection. Previous land-based communication systems required submarines to surface and reduce
speeds in order to receive messages, thereby putting the vessel and crew at risk. Id. at 414 n.l.
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Navy did not issue a SEIS. 129 The lower court agreed with the plaintiff's
contention and enjoined the Navy from proceeding with Project ELF.
130
An EIS is a prerequisite to the implementation of any major federal
project significantly affecting the quality of the environment. 13' More-
over, pursuant to the Council on Environmental Quality Regulations, a
federal agency is required to supplement an original EIS if: "(i) [t]he
agency makes substantial changes in the proposed action that are rele-
vant to environmental concerns; or (ii) [t]here are significant new circum-
stances or information relevant to environmental concerns and bearing
on the proposed action or its impacts. 1 32 The decision to issue an EIS
or a SEIS is left to the agency's discretion. Accordingly, the standard of
review of an agency's decision not to issue an EIS or a SEIS is that the
reviewing court must set aside the agency's determination if it was "arbi-
trary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with the law."' 133 Therefore, the Seventh Circuit was called on to deter-
mine in the instant case whether the Navy acted arbitrarily and capri-
ciously in deciding not to issue a SEIS in light of the new information
available.
The Seventh Circuit read plaintiff's complaint as alleging that the
Navy failed to prepare a SEIS in 1981. Although the duty to supplement
is a continuing one, the court noted, considering that the alleged failure
occurred in 1981, the only information that could be considered in re-
viewing the decision was the information available in 1981, not subse-
quently arising information. 34 In defining the phrase of "significant
information" as used in the pertinent Council on Environmental Quality
regulation,1 35 the court held "that an agency cannot have acted arbitrar-
ily or capriciously in deciding not to file a SEIS unless the new informa-
tion provides a seriously different picture of the environmental landscape
such that another hard look is necessary."'' 36 In short, the court held
that NEPA could have been violated only if the new information was
itself significant enough to require a SEIS.137
129. Id. at 414-15, 419 n.7.
130. Wisconsin v. Weinberger, 578 F. supp. 1327 (W.D. Wis. 1984).
131. See infra note 105 and accompanying text.
132. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.9(c)(1)(i)-(ii)(1984). This regulation is explicitly incorporated into De-
partment of Defense and Navy regulations. See 32 C.F.R. § 773(b)(1)(1984); 32 C.F.R. § 214 Encl.
1, D(4),(1984).
133. Wisconsin v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 412, 417 (7th Cir. 1984) (quoting Simons v. Gorsuch,
715 F.2d 1248, 1251 (7th Cir. 1983)).
134. Wisconsin v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 412, 418-19 (7th Cir. 1984).
135. See infra note 132 and accompanying text.
136. Wisconsin v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d at 418 (emphasis in original).
137. Id. at 431 n.4 (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
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After an extensive review of the evidence and new information, 38
the court concluded that the new information did not meet the level of
significance as to require a ruling that the Navy acted arbitrarily or capri-
ciously in not responding with a SEIS. 139 Therefore, the Seventh Circuit
held that the Navy had not violated NEPA.
In dissent, Judge Cudahy attacked the majority's analysis and con-
clusion. Initially, the dissent disagreed with the majority's "suprisingly
narrow and rigid reading of the complaint.'14° A fair reading of the
complaint, it was urged, showed an allegation of a continuing breach of a
continuing duty. That duty is breached when an agency goes forward
with a project without considering new, relevant information and contin-
ues until the material is considered. 141
The central issue, Judge Cudahy argued, was not whether the infor-
mation was so significant as to require a SEIS. 142 On the contrary, the
issue was whether the Navy breached its duty to monitor relevant new
information. Considering that the regulations and NEPA offer scant gui-
dance concerning new information and ongoing projects, the dissent be-
lieved the proper analysis approach was the approach developed in
Warm Springs Dam Task Force v. Gribble. 1
43
Under the Warm Springs Dam approach, NEPA places a duty on an
agency to continue to monitor new information, evaluate it and make a
reasoned determination as to whether or not it is of sufficient significance
to require the filing of a SEIS.144 The duty to monitor is not limited to
information which is significant enough to require a formal SEIS.' 45 In
Warm Springs Dam, the Ninth Circuit ruled that an agency may be in
breach of its duty when it does not carefully consider new, relevant infor-
mation.146 In summarizing the Warm Springs Dam approach, the dis-
sent concluded that an agency acts arbitrarily and capriciously when it
138. Id. at 420-24.
139. Id. at 424. The court found the new data uncertain. For example, one of the scientists who
gathered the information acknowledged that her work was merely "exploratory" and suffered from
methodological weaknesses, such as, the testing was done at higher voltages than used in Project
ELF. Other scientists deemed certain results "speculative." Id. at 423.
140. Id. at 428 n. 1 (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
141. Id. (emphasis original). The alleged breach was a violation of 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9(c) (1984).
See infra note 132 and accompanying text.
142. Weinberger, 745 F.2d at 429 (Cudahy, J., dissenting). The district court expressly refused
to conclude that the information met the level of significance which would require a SEIS. However,
the lower court ruled that the information was significant enough to require careful review by the
Navy. Wisconsin v. Weinberger, 578 F. Supp. 1327, 1362-63 (W.D. Wis. 1984).
143. 621 F.2d 1017 (9th Cir. 1980).
144. Id. at 1024.
145. Id. at 1025.
146. Id.
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ignores new information even though the new information ultimately
does not warrant a full-scale SEIS, and that is precisely what the lower
court found. 147  Thus, Judge Cudahy would have upheld the lower
court's finding of a NEPA violation.
As in River Road Alliance, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers of United
States Army, 4 it appears that the majority's framing of the issue on ap-
peal greatly altered the resolution of the case. In the present case, the
majority cast the issue as whether the Navy had acted arbitrarily and
capriciously in determining not to prepare an EIS. The district court,
however, did not rule that the Navy acted in such a manner. The lower
court ruled merely that the Navy acted arbitrarily and capriciously in not
considering the new information.' 49 Thus, the majority reviewed a rul-
ing that the lower court did not make. The thrust of the lower court's
opinion was that due to the Navy's lack of consideration of the new in-
formation, the Navy did not have an adequate basis from which to deter-
mine whether an SEIS was necessary. In short, the problem was with the
basis of the determination, not with the determination itself.
Moreover, the majority's framing of the issues enabled the court to
avoid confronting the Ninth Circuit's Warm Springs Dam approach.' 50
Under an accurate casting of the issue, the Warm Springs Dam approach
would have been applicable. An analysis of this approach in the present
case would have led, at least in the dissent's view, to a result contrary to
the decision arrived at by the majority. To reach its decision the major-
ity had to slide around the central issue of the case which permitted it to
skitter around a case and avenue of analysis on point. Those reasons
alone make the Wisconsin v. Weinberger decision unsound.
CONCLUSION
The cases decided by the Seventh Circuit in its 1984-85 term consist-
ently presented competing environmental and commercial interests. The
Seventh Circuit regularly ruled in favor of the commercial interests.
Although the environmental statutes are often couched in terms of envi-
ronmental concerns,15' the statutes attempt to strike a balance between
competing environmental and commercial concerns.
52
147. Wisconsin v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d at 431-32 (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
148. 764 F.2d 445 (7th Cir. 1985). See infra notes 104-26 and accompanying text.
149. Wisconsin v. Weinberger, 578 F. Supp. 1327, 1362-63 (W.D. Wis. 1984).
150. See infra notes 143-46 and accompanying text.
151. For example, Congress amended the Clean Water Act in an effort "to restore and maintain
the chemical, physical and biological integrity of the Nation's waters." 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1982).
152. For example, NEPA articulates "a national policy [to] encourage productive and enjoyable
harmony between man and his environment," 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1967).
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Neither environmental interests nor commercial interests are so in-
significant as to warrant lack of consideration. Both interests are sub-
stantial, and both are essential to a healthy society. Recognizing this,
Congress struck a balance by promulgating the environmental statutes in
order to achieve a fair compromise between the contrasting concerns.
However, this balance is tipped heavily toward one side when the courts
called on to interpret the statutes resolve cases with a decidedly commer-
cial bent. In bare form, the statutes may strike an even balance; however,
the Seventh Circuit's rulings on the statutes consistently add less weight
to the environmental side of the scale.
